Weaponisation of social media and online information is a real and emerging threat. Hence, this article aims to broaden our understanding of this phenomenon by introducing the concept of mimetic warfare. Borrowing from mimesis, or a particular representation of reality, this article delves into information conflicts as the ones involving a struggle between well-prepared comprehensive narratives that are intended to affect a target population's cognition and behaviour. Mimesis as a concept is seen as particularly useful in explaining the multiplicity, proliferation and appeal of such representations and interpretations of facts, events or phenomena. The article then presents a case for the Western states' proactive involvement in mimetic operations at the home front in order to maintain cohesion and not to cede ground to hostile foreign powers.
Introduction
The cyberspace undoubtedly has become an extremely important part of security studies. However, whereas cyber espionage, cyber terrorism or cyber warfare are widely discussed and analysed, the social aspect of cyber security, including the use of social media in offensive information operations, has only recently become part of mainstream research and still remains conceptually under-developed. This article will delve into social media storytelling as a tool for changing the cognition and behaviour of substantial groups of people.
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This article introduces a concept of mimetic warfare. Mimesis -artistic representation of reality -is taken from Plato's Republic in order to define, within the remit of this article, a coherent, well-polished and purposive representation of reality. Hence, mimetic warfare is, essentially, a battle between carefully and purposefully developed narratives that attempt to sway people's opinions and affect their actions. Mimetic warfare is juxtaposed to memetic warfare, the latter being based upon the Internet meme culture and used to describe a fragmented and dispersed way of conveying messages through individual carriers of meaning (memes).
The rise of social media has enabled individuals to actively partake in the creation and dissemination of knowledge. Today's information environment is characterised by the absence of a dominant direction of information and a multitude of interconnected information networks. Individuals are thus enabled to participate in political or sometimes even military action potentially without even realising one's involvement, but merely by participating in online communities and sharing information produced by or propagated through such communities. The above situation also signals an important change in comparison to traditional propaganda, which used to be disseminated by specialised institutions. Instead, in the era of social media, everyone can be a (sometimes unwitting) propagandist.
The article concludes with some suggestions as to what is to be done in the current security environment. It is argued that that the West should do more to keep their societies on board and pre-emptively protect and strengthen Western values as the backbone of our everyday lives.
Social media as a security threat
Despite early optimism as to the (almost exclusively) democratic potential of social media, they have since proved to have a rather ambiguous impact on social mobilisation. On the one hand, there is the clear benefit of reduced need for intermediaries (traditional media), 1 thus allowing citizens themselves to actively shape socio-political landscapes, empowering underrepresented groups or the citizenry in general to challenge centrally sourced news and put forward their own 
perspectives.
2 It is de rigueur to stress the role of social media in spreading information, mobilising people, creating protest networks both nationally and internationally.
3
To this extent, social media provide 'more readily available, immediate and equal access to public sphere'.
4 Also, by erasing distance, it is argued, the social media succeeded in 'making the remote local', i.e. enabling people to connect across geographically dispersed locations. 5 It has even been claimed that social media create an ethic of 'perpetual participation' 6 and that internet penetration, provided there is adequate infrastructure, 'facilitates democratic change by cultivating prodemocratic attitudes '. 7 On the other hand, however, social media also provide platforms for subversive and extremist views, propaganda, and (deliberate or not) false rumours. 8 There are indications that penetration of social media has a tendency to instigate collective violence by exacerbating group differences, particularly when participation happens along segregated lines.
9 Social media can also have a destabilising effect by causing dissatisfaction with democracy through raising demands that are either impossible or detached from underlying realities 10 or through fostering disagreement on fundamental issues.
11 This contradictory nature of social media was particularly evident in Ukraine, where social media were both crucial in organising prodemocracy and pro-Europe protests, which ultimately led to the overthrow of 2 Brian D. Loader and Dan Mercea, 'Networking Democracy? ', Information, Communication & Society 14, no. 6 (2011): 757-769, 759. 3 See e.g. Mohammad Al-Momani, 'The Arab 'Youth Quake': Implications on Democratization and Stability ', Middle East Law and Governance, 3, no. 1-2, (2011): 159-170 ; Habibul Haque Khondker, 'Role of the New Media in the Arab Spring ', Globalizations 8, no. 5 (2011): 675-679. 4 Emma Price, 'Social Media and Democracy', Australian Journal of Political Science 48, no. 4 (2013) President Yanukovitch and have extensively been used for propaganda purposes in the ensuing Ukraine-Russia conflict.
In fact, it is by now quite obvious that 'aggressive communication tactics and broader warfare through trolling and memes is a necessary, inexpensive, and easy way to help destroy the appeal and morale' of the opposing camp. 12 The intention is always 'to get effects, actions, and changes in behaviour from [...] target audiences'.
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Such effort is being actively employed by both state actors, such as Russia and China, and non-state ones, such as ISIS.
14 Hence, the early enthusiasm regarding information on social media as 'authentic, transparent, user-driven' 15 has proved to be premature: it is authentic only inasmuch as a significant amount of people (with the exception of professional salaried trolls) do believe in what they are sharing but not in terms of a more immediate access to underlying 'reality', it is anything but transparent, and user-driven only in terms of its propagation rather than creation. In fact, even the positive effects, such as connecting and mobilising individuals and spreading information can be used to a detrimental effect by hostile forces through strategic communications or information warfare: social media enable rapid propagation and strong psychological impact of such endeavours.
In terms of weaponised information, it is useful to distinguish between two paradigms: strategic communications, employed by NATO, and information warfare, used by Russia. 16 18 It is thus clear that strategic communications offers a more restrictive scope of actions than information warfare. This might also be indicative of a deeper conceptual and doctrinal difference: NATO's emphasis on conventional military power and deterrence and Russia's embracing of asymmetric capacities and a proactive -aggressive -stance. 19 As a result, it must be stressed that Western militaries approach the era of weaponised social media from a position of relative weakness.
Information warfare largely relies on trolling as a specific type of behaviour. A troll, in this context, can be defined as 'a person who often chooses to remain anonymous, while posting statements that are designed to persuade or influence thinking or emotions through the use of half-truths or deceptive information'. 20 In fact, it might not even be of substantial importance whether the troll believes what she or he is sharing: what might be a purely performative act for one, can represent reality to others, inducing very real belief and action. Hence, even half-honesty can be the basis for others' truth claims and corresponding behaviour. Meanwhile, the aim of information warfare operations is to achieve reflexive control: 'a means of conveying to a partner or an opponent information that is specially prepared to incline him to voluntarily make the predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the action'. 21 This manipulation includes both affecting the perceptions and corresponding actions of foreign decision makers and of substantial sections of foreign (or domestic, for that matter) populations. In fact, the two are interrelated: elite discourse and decisions have an impact on popular opinion (or at least set the agenda for public debate) while public opinion, if swayed, influences political agenda and impacts upon political decisions.
It is rather intuitive to begin from an analysis of such endeavours in the context of open hostilities, i.e. cases such as Ukraine. However, to do this would mean unduly limiting the scope of enquiry. In fact, it is necessary to have in mind that Western societies themselves are objects of manipulation through all kinds of media, including social media, 22 particularly in the context of such developments 24 However, this premise is both illustrative and deceptive: it is illustrative because it allows understanding the contingent nature of whatever we consider to be the organising principles of our societies; however, it is deceptive because the umbrella term 'Western' implies that people in this part of the world are somehow naturally inclined to value the same things. The success of, for example, ISIS in recruiting Westerners further demonstrates the point. As a result, there also is a need for more assertiveness in protecting and strengthening values inside Western societies. Hence, Western strategic communications effort should be directed not only at Sun Tzu's ideal of winning even without fighting 25 but also at making sure that we ourselves do not succumb to an adversary in the same way.
In an effort to describe and analyse challenges in the area of information security and strategic communications, the concept of memetic warfare has recently been gaining some traction. Defined as 'taking control of the dialogue, narrative and psychological space', 26 and borrowing from internet memes 'their capacity to spread with extreme rapidity', 27 this concept is, certainly, an interesting innovation. Memetic warfare works by employing the social media logic of viral spread of information, particularly with regards to memes -images that contain a comprehensive and catchy message. These images then act as conveyors of information, objects and symbols of identification, and rallying cries. However, as it will be argued in the next part of the article, the proponents of memetic warfare only identify the surface layer (the aims and the means) correctly but miss the crucial cognitive and motivational factors behind the actions of individuals involved, the latter being best captured by mimesis as a particular representation of reality. Although sharing protest memes, changing social media avatars in solidarity with social movements or with victims of terrorist attacks could easily fall into a category of 'slacktivism', devoid of any real-world effects, 28 these actions are, at least in some cases, not only public pledges of allegiance but also vehicles for collective identifications and disseminators of calls to action. 29 Emphasis on memes and online identity formation is particularly potent in our current environment, in which 'identity is constructed as a result of our interaction with digital media '. 30 However, as it is to be argued, the difference between memes-in-themselves and mimesis is also precisely the difference between the calls that have remained virtual and calls that have broken through to real life. This transformation from potential to actual cannot happen without an explicit understanding of what, why and how is to be done. This explanatory function, as argued in the following part of this article, is being carried out not by sporadic memes but by mimetic representations of reality.
Crucially, in a social media environment, individuals co-create their own and group opinions by exchanging and discussing information, and as soon as 'someone has found the "truth" they in turn become propagandists and help others to reach the same conclusions '. 31 It is this mutuality and solidarity that makes social media information warfare particularly dangerous by removing intermediaries and easily recognisable propaganda agents while replacing them with otherwise ordinary individuals whom nobody would suspect of having a political agenda (and often they indeed do not have a conscious agenda of their own). 32 In fact, then, such individuals step in precisely at the point at which the more visible trolls have left. A mimetic warfare operation has then reached a stage of self-sufficiency: no or very little input for the original perpetrators is needed, and the adherents of a particular narrative take over not only the propagation but also, to a large extent, the creation of content.
In such networked environment, harmful information spreads in a fashion similar to a computer virus: from one 'infected' user to another (or to many others). A network of such users (which could be called a social botnet) can be employed in spreading the message (i.e. enlarging the network itself ) or remain nearly hibernated to the degree of only carrying out low-level background activity (in order to maintain collective identity), or be activated to its full capacity for preplanned large-scale information offensives, when a large amount of information is released in conjunction with other -political and military -actions in order to ensure dominance over the information supply and demand chain. Hence, while 'traditional' cyber security is preoccupied with threats to networks and infrastructure, information security should concentrate on the social/identity infrastructure of communities within a state.
Understanding mimetic warfare
As already indicated in the previous part, instead of a scattered memetic approach, one should employ a concerted mimetic effort. Essentially, as evidenced by the proliferation of weaponised information, '[t]ruth, as in fact or piece of information, has no intrinsic value. It is up to the narrative to create that value'.
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The narrative itself, however, has a very dubious relation to truth: to be more precise, '[t]the truth in the narrative is [...] not in its verifiability, but in its verisimilitude -the appearance of it being real or true'. 34 And the latter observation brings us to the concept of mimesis. Indeed, it must be argued that promotion of an underlying representation of reality, which unifies all efforts, is crucial, and mimesis is an indispensable tool for understanding weaponised information on social media.
Mimesis, as a concept, refers to 'the interpretation of reality through literary representation or "imitation"'. 35 The term itself comes from Ancient Greece, having originally meant to mimic, to represent, or to imitate. 36 Socrates, as represented in Plato's Republic, had turned it into an object of critique for being removed from a fact or a thing and being concerned with only human representation of it. To be more precise, there is a triple removal from reality in mimesis: the ideal idea of the thing, the thing itself as produced by a craftsman and only then its mimetic representation. 38 Essentially, then, mimesis is all about appearance and not truth: an imperfect representation of something that was itself imperfect in the first place (since any manufactured object can only strive to approximate the idea of that object). 39 In fact, according to Socrates' critique of mimesis, both visual and verbal representations have nothing to do with truth at all and deal with the lower part of the mind only. 40 But the most serious allegation, and immediately relevant for this article, is that '[w]e surrender ourselves, let ourselves be carried along'. 41 Crucially, there is something captivating in mimesis as representation and in the way in which it creates the appearance of reality: it is extremely difficult to escape its appeal. That something, it will be subsequently argued, is a narrative that gives sense to the disparate elements of representation and also makes one feel like he or she is part of the story being told, hence encouraging to emotionally and otherwise invest in a particular issue under description.
Mimesis, to reiterate, is inherently and unavoidably flawed: it is but an imperfect representation or imitation of reality. This means a few things: first, there may be, and usually are, many mimetic representations of the same phenomenon; second, no mimetic representation is unassailable -there is always a gap between a representation and what is being represented. Both of these problems have a significant impact on security. The ability to always interpret facts otherwise provides the basis for the very existence of mimetic warfare: no interpretation is ever final and stable, and counter-interpretations spring up. This particularly applies to value judgements (e.g. 'the absence of borders in Europe is a major achievement' vs. 'the Schengen area is a threat to economic and public security') but can also extend to discursive (although, of course, not factual) realities (e.g. 'MH17 was downed by a Russian missile' vs. 'MH17 was downed by a Ukrainian fighter jet'). These discursive realities, however, become real through their own effects: in terms of how people act and think (which is, ultimately, the all-important dimension of politics), it is immaterial who actually downed MH17 or what effect the Schengen area actually has -the only thing that matters is what people consider to be the case. In terms of the triple remove, characteristic of mimesis, one can distinguish between the fact, its effect and a representation of that effect or between an event, 38 Plato, Republic, translated and edited by Robin Waterfield (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press,1994), XIII: 597b; see also Gebauer and Wulf, Mimesis, [37] [38] Plato, Republic, XIII: 598b. 40 Ibid., XIII: 600e-601b; 603a-605c. 41 Ibid., XIII:605d. direct/eyewitness experience and a representation of that experience. In both cases, this remove clearly obscures access to the object in question. For this same reason, it is always possible to (truly or at least discursively) challenge any truth claim made through mimetic representation. If that was not the case, mimetic warfare would be futile -people would just be throwing ideas and representations past one another. Instead, there evidently is some 'stickiness': people do switch sides or, more often, turn from neutrality to commitment to a cause.
Emphasis on mimesis, rather than memetic effort, also challenges the common assertion that in today's world grand narratives are dead or, at least, ineffective, 42 a condition further exacerbated by shortening attention spans in the wake of technological development.
43 Narratives, however, help to sift through the noise and conflicting information that one gets by offering a simple and seemingly uncontroversial answer, which (re)establishes the order of things. Where previously one encountered only a cornucopia of disparate things (and that includes the memes of memetic warfare), now one encounters an ordered totality, which makes sense as to how the status quo has developed, its normative value (good or bad), and direction of action (protect or change).
Crucially, mimetic warfare taps into a democratic paradox, where citizens are expected to have opinions on all important questions and yet usually lack the knowledge to hold such opinions. 44 Moreover, despite the online environment now being the main (and, for the most part, readily available) source of information, this lack of knowledge cannot be eliminated in the digital environment due to the prevalent tribalism and fragmentation of the public sphere, where different information communities are just shut in their hermetic silos, 45 making it impossible to get a full picture. Such fragmentation is further exacerbated by ever more fragmented media consumption and the shrinking of spaces for real interaction. 46 as the optimistic narrative would have it, this fragmentation only turns social media users into relatively easy targets for well-orchestrated mimetic campaigns, ready to coalesce under well-prepared narratives.
When faced with impossible demands for mastery and coherence of information, citizens are particularly susceptible to trolls who 'create a simulacrum of public opinion'.
48 And yet, a simulacrum, as noted by Baudrillard, could well be more real than reality itself, not in terms of masking reality but by actually standing in for a reality that does not exist. 49 Essentially, a simulacrum becomes real through its own effects when people, as mentioned above, start acting as if (in this case) particular piece of information is correct, even without this information having a discernible referent in actual life. The popularisation of news, when stories are being condensed to, or even replaced by, images, easy-to-digest narratives, and scandalous instances, a trend that has been constant, albeit uneven, over the past decades, 50 has also contributed to creating a simulacra-saturated culture. When one is being fed simulacra all the time, it is extremely difficult to expect a display of critical thinking with regards to them.
Of core importance is a coherent narrative as a device that provides meaning and explanations: "[i]t describes the past, justifies the present, and presents a vision of the future".
51 Narratives 'explain the world and set constraints on the imaginable and actionable, and shape perceived interests'.
52 Such narrative is of particular importance in the era of information overload, when our understanding of the world and its phenomena is becoming more and more muddled. 53 When faced with uncertainty, people demand 'simple stories that provide them with relevant information, talking points, and an explanation of how the topic in question fits into their worldview'; such narratives are usually also laden with value judgements. ', Media, War & Conflict 7, no. 1 (2014): 70-84, 76. 53 Holmstrom, 'Narrative and Social Media', 121. 54 Ibid., 121. representations of the socio-political environment are intended at bringing some audiences together to create a supposedly enlightened public. Hence, a concerted effort is unleashed against a fragmented landscape, which only serves to enhance the effect of mimetic warfare: any hermetic silos are just too limited and weak to provide a counterbalance to a mimetically united public.
In terms of spreading particular memes and mimetic messages online, perhaps the core difference is that between an individual-centric relation to an issue in memetic warfare and collective identification with an issue with mimetic warfare (because mimesis provides a community narrative). Those identifying with an issue individually may be numerous but, lacking the collective power of a movement, are likely to remain within the 'slacktivism' framework and are, therefore, a lesser security threat (this does not deny their usefulness in mimetic warfare as propagators of information -they are just unlikely to go beyond that). In the meantime, those possessing collective identity and conscious of their strength in numbers can be expected to be more inclined towards action outside the online environment. And at the heart of this difference is the absence or presence of a unifying narrative, which explains why and how collective action is to be taken.
Crucially, mimetic warfare operations are not always easily perceptible because the aim rarely is to openly contradict the adversary (that would require a seismic shift in public opinion, which is extremely difficult to achieve) but, building on already well-known and accepted stories, try to attach new meanings or reassign the order of values, so as to achieve a shift in opinion in the long term.
55 After all, public opinion is mostly built upon what people think to be the content of an issue, a problem or a concept. 56 The mimetic emphasis on representation and imitation is particularly important when considering subtle alterations of the images and stories that people already have in mind: again, not the underlying object, not the relationship between this object and the truth claims made with regards to it, but the internal structure of the claim and its internal veritability that is at stake. As long as that internal coherence and veritability is not diminished, all other elements of a particular mimetic representation are malleable.
In fact, it is only through its accumulated effects that mimetic warfare becomes truly visible. To give an extreme example, any anti-state disturbance indicates that 55 Holmstrom, 'The Narrative and Social Media', 127; see also e.g. Dennis Chong and James N. the national mimetic effort has already failed to reach or convince a section of the population, 57 and an enemy narrative has taken over. But the effects could easily (and more likely) be less extreme, albeit still rather clearly visible, since another target of mimetic warfare is trust -an attribute crucial to healthy societal interactions and in helping solve collective action problems, 58 openness to one's vulnerability, 59 political engagement and participation 60 and so forth -especially when it is reciprocal. 61 In its purely political dimension, trust denotes one's attitude towards the state and society.
62 Therefore, instilling distrust among different groups of the opponent's citizenry and/or between the citizenry and the government can easily be seen as a strategic aim. Once distrust is sown, it is relatively easy to pitch different groups against each other and manipulate their actions; in a similar manner, such situation creates conditions for provoking hostilities towards the state itself and/or a heavyhanded response by the state apparatus, thus further antagonising the sides. And even if an internal conflict is not provoked, once the citizens have lost trust in their state, any hostile action becomes much easier to carry out.
Mimetic operations can make use of some fertile ground here. After all, the perceived image of a candidate, a party or even a country is shaped by how people feel about it, and these preconceptions are even capable of determining the perception of actual policies once they are implemented. The only thing that is needed is a particular representation of the background, the agenda and the (potential) vested interests of the government. Regardless of the underlying substance of such claims, their effect, nevertheless, depends primarily on the mimetic verisimilitude of the narrative itself. Yet again, though, a scattered approach is insufficient -one needs a coherent mimetic structure -a narrative -to provide effective explanation. For example, austerity measures affecting the benefits system can be seen as necessary and reasonable in order to tackle dependency culture or as heartless calculations of an out of touch government, intent on hurting the most vulnerable. In this case, 57 the core determining factor is the preconception of the dominant party of the government: either as economically sound and reasonable or as only caring for the rich. Of course, politics has always been about different preconceptions. However, whereas previously that struggle was one between ideologies, i.e. people first had a preconception of what the society is and ought to be and then chose to stick with a certain party regardless of its image, the current tendency is for the party image to come first, with the actual ideological background fading away. 63 Different interpretations as to why this has been the case notwithstanding, one thing is clear: it is the 'feel good' factor that has become particularly important. And this factor can only be added or subtracted by succinctly but unequivocally explaining how and why a particular actual or desired outcome is 'right'.
Furthermore, an international aspect exists just as well, particularly since international relations, just as any other human sphere of action, is often wrought with habitual perceptions: a particular state is, for the sake of cognitive economy, automatically classified in a habitual way ('friend', 'foe', 'peaceful', 'failed' etc.) regardless of the particular situation, and these interpretive schemes are deeply entrenched in the cultural patterns of the international community. 64 Consequently, it is in every state's interest to foster as favourable habitual associations as possible. Otherwise, even sensible actions of the state can be misinterpreted because of the negative baggage trailing from the past. As a result, the aims are to sway the target audiences and alter their cognitive schemes so that what a country does is interpreted favourably, 65 to retain a positive image, or to reshape what is considered to be a stigma. 66 Correspondingly, mimetic warfare is intended not on hindering such efforts by the target state but also on actively degrading its reputation. and domestically.
73 Involvement in mimetic operations would only take the same logic one step further.
Moreover, while offensive mimetic warfare would certainly require more extensive justification, operations directed at the home audience should be properly seen as proactive self-defence. After all, the domestic population is already a battleground anyway -it is only a matter of engaging an adversary in that already existing battleground. Moreover, there is also some distance to be held. While covert mimetic efforts may come from particular states (or, perhaps, NATO itself ), the development of an overt and widespread campaign is neither likely nor productive.
In fact, open and active government involvement would do little beyond arousal of suspicion. Instead, overt mimetic effort should involve provision of a basic narrative and enlisting of private sector organisations (both for-profits and NGOs) for the actual communication work. At least in audience perceptions (and that is an added mimetic layer), the campaign has to be as much about grassroots initiative as possible. And this outsourcing could just as well be seen as removing one of the burdens and limitations that governments would otherwise have in engaging in proactive mimetic self-defence.
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Conclusion
This article has argued for a mimetic approach to analysing weaponised information online and proactive approach to self-defence of the 'home front'". An emphasis on mimesis enriches the analysis of weaponised social media through revealing the centrality of essentially and unavoidably contestable representational structures through narratives capable of explaining the world and inspiring action.
Crucially, the mimetic opponents involved in promoting certain images, associations and narratives moulding the perceptions of target populations according to particular interests and aims. In this way, (self-)presentation becomes a permanent campaign in which every action and decision contributes, either positively or negatively, to the loyalty and support of the domestic and foreign audiences. The advent of the social media has even further strengthened the trend and added new challenges: since content is now largely socially generated, online communities have become especially powerful -if not central -creators (and, simultaneously, consumers) of the mimetic representations concerning factual (or fictional) events, trends and values pertaining to a particular state or an entire region. And that active creativity can readily be used as a weapon. Hence, it is of particular importance to prevent an adversary from gaining momentum.
